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ABSTRACT
The goal of most research on anonymity, including all cur-
rently used systems for anonymity, is to achieve anonymity
through unlinkability: an adversary should not be able to
determine the correspondence between the input and out-
put messages of the system. An alternative anonymity goal
is unobservability: an adversary should not be able to de-
termine who sends and who receives messages. We study
the effect of k-anonymity, a weak form of unobservability,
on two types of attacks against systems that provide only
unlinkability.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Networks]: General—Security and pro-
tection; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy




statistical disclosure, mass surveillance, k-anonymity
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we are concerned with two different security
conditions related to anonymity:
• Unlinkability in an anonymity system is the property
that the messages delivered by the system during some
time period are “unlinkable” to the messages input
to the system during that time period. Unlinkabil-
ity is the typical goal of systems for anonymous com-
munication for a number of reasons. For example, it
turns out that this is exactly the property guaranteed
by Chaum’s mix server (if the mix is trusted and ap-
propriate ciphertext padding is used to conceal input
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length) or by a mix cascade (in case at least one mix
in the chain is trustworthy). Even in systems where no
special trusted servers are assumed, unlinkability can
typically be achieved (whether provably or not) with
low communication overhead.
• Unobservability is a property of the principals in an
anonymity scheme: roughly, a scheme is sender un-
observable if the communications of senders and non-
senders are indistinguishable, and it is receiver unob-
servable if the communications of those principals who
receive messages and those who do not are indistin-
guishable. Receiver unobservability can be obtained,
for example, by broadcast of encrypted messages, or
through use of a trusted bulletin board. Sender unob-
servability (in a mix) can be obtained through careful
use of padding and dummy messages, and is also the
security goal of the DC-Net family of protocols [4, 18,
13, 10, 17]. Unobservability is not commonly provided
by fielded anonymity schemes, because it involves more
communication overhead, and schemes designed for
unobservability may be fault-intolerant.
1.1 Attacks on unlinkable schemes
It is not hard to see that unlinkability by itself does not
guarantee deterrence of all types of traffic analysis. In par-
ticular, since a system providing unlinkability need not hide
the fact that Alice sends a message, or the fact that Bob
receives a message, such systems can (and most often do)
leak other information, such as the volume of messages sent
and received by its users. This information in turn can be
used effectively in several types of attacks; in this paper we
specifically consider two attacks: the long-term intersection
attack and the budget-constrained mass surveillance attack.
1.1.1 Intersection attacks
Long-term intersection attacks against anonymity schemes
attempt to discover the pattern of communications by a sin-
gle user, say Alice. As an example, consider the case where
Alice sends messages through a batch mix to a single re-
cipient, Bob. Then by intersecting the sets of users who
receive a message from each batch where Alice sends a mes-
sage, an eavesdropping adversary can eventually conclude
that Alice’s single recipient is Bob.
More general long-term intersection attacks against un-
linkable anonymity schemes work under three assumptions:
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probability distribution, distinct from other users.
• The adversary can determine when a user has (with
some probability) received a message
• The adversary can distinguish whether Alice might
have contributed a message delivered by the system
with reasonable probability.
By taking appropriate measurements of the patterns of re-
cipients when Alice is probably sending and when she is
probably not sending (not prevented solely by unlinkabil-
ity), Alice’s approximate set of recipients can be recovered.
An anonymity system that aims only to provide unlinka-
bility cannot hope to prevent such an attack; even if the fact
that Alice sends is concealed by some means such as run-
ning her own mix, she will occasionally go offline, allowing
the attacker to label some delivered messages as not coming
from Alice. Thus an important property of an anonymity
system is its resistance to long-term intersection attacks, as
measured by (for instance) the amount of time until an ad-
versary can guess all of Alice’s recipients.
1.1.2 Surveillance attacks
Suppose Eve wishes to eavesdrop on the communications
of a large social network, by initiating a program of surveil-
lance on the members of the network. For Eve, there is a
definite cost to each member of the network that she places
under direct surveillance - for example, the risk of getting
caught infiltrating a computer, or the price of obtaining a
warrant to perform the surveillance. A natural goal of Eve’s
would be to eavesdrop on as many members’ communication
as possible, given a fixed budget for surveillance. If Eve
knows directly the communication patterns of each mem-
ber - say, who communicates with whom - then it has been
shown by Danezis and Wittneben [7] that it is possible to
eavesdrop on nearly the entire network by placing only a few
nodes under direct surveillance.
We would naturally expect unlinkability to increase the
cost of surveillance (i.e., reduce the amount of communica-
tions eavesdropped upon for a given budget) since it con-
ceals exactly this information. However, Danezis and Wit-
tneben [7] have also given evidence that even given only
information about the volume of communications produced
by each member of the network (which is not necessarily
concealed by a system for unlinkability), it is still possible
to eavesdrop on 50% of the network members while placing
only 5% of nodes under surveillance.
1.2 Effects of unobservability
In this paper, we consider the effect of unobservable com-
munications on each of these attacks. It is easy to see
that with static membership, that is, when all principals of
the protocol are always online and participating, a receiver-
unobservable anonymity scheme will prevent long-term in-
tersection attacks completely. We extend the notion of un-
observability to what we call a “periodic” model in which
time is divided into fixed periods; in each period the set of
principals who are online and participating is static. We
show that periodic receiver-unobservability anonymity also
maximally prevents long-term intersection attacks.
In the context of surveillance, Danezis and Wittneben [7]
conjecture that sender-unobservability may be a better de-
fensive measure than unlinkability. We present the results
of experiments supporting this conjecture: unobservability
can significantly increase the cost of achieving a given level
of surveillance in a social network. Interestingly, our re-
sults suggest that unobservability is not, in itself, a per-
fect defense against targeted surveillance: the slope of the
cost/benefit curve for surveillance against an sender - un-
observable social network is still greater than the optimal
defensive value of 1. We conjecture that this is a result of
the “scale-free” nature of social network graphs.
Finally, we consider the effect of k-anonymity, a weaker
form of unobservability, on both attacks. For the simple
case of uniform background traffic, we prove that periodic
receiver k-anonymity, even with a period of 1 batch, can in-
crease the number of rounds required to find all of Alice’s
recipients with a given confidence level, by a multiplicative
factor slightly super-linear in k, while increasing communi-
cation cost by a factor of k/2. We present the results of
experiments showing that this gap between cost and ben-
efit is increased when the background traffic distribution
is unknown to the adversary. Finally, we present the re-
sult of experiments testing the effects of static and periodic
k-anonymity on targeted surveillance of a social network.
These results suggest that static, sender k-anonymity can
significantly increase the cost of targeted surveillance on a
social network, but that periodic k-anonymity does not pro-
vide significantly increased resistance over unlinkability.
2. RELATED WORK
Long-term intersection attacks seem to have been folk-
lore (for instance, see [14, 3]) until the Disclosure attack
was formalized by Kesdogan, Agrawal, and Penz [11]. Since
carrying out the Disclosure attack requires solving an NP-
hard constraint satisfaction problem, Danezis [6] proposed
the Statistical Disclosure attack, which only approximately
recovers the list of Alice’s recipients. Mathewson and Din-
gledine [12] show how to extend statistical disclosure to the
case of unknown background traffic, and consider the resis-
tance to statistical disclosure provided by several factors,
such as using chains of mixes, pool mixes, sender padding,
and assuming incomplete network observation. They con-
clude that some settings of anonymity parameters can give
favorable resistance to statistical disclosure. Berthold and
Langos [2] note that the problem in intersection attacks is
the difference in output behavior when Alice is online or of-
fline, and propose a scheme where other network principals
continue to send messages for Alice when she goes offline. It
is not clear that this approach can be made practical.
Danezis and Wittneben [7] were the first to consider the
issue of resistance to surveillance of social networks. They
obtained the mailing list archives of an international politi-
cal organization, and considered the effectiveness of various
surveillance strategies. They conclude that, for their data
set, unlinkable communications do not provide good pro-
tection against mass surveillance of a social network. They
also suggested that unobservability might be of greater value
than unlinkability in this context.
Although the majority of widely-used anonymity systems
concentrate on unlinkability, several research designs for un-
observable networks have been proposed. For example, the
DC-Net [4] and its descendants all provide unobservable
communication among a network of N principals, at a com-
munication cost of Ω(N) per message delivered, with no
trusted parties. Several other proposed protocols, including
• Alice picks her recipients according to a consistent
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P5 [15] and Xor-trees [8], provide receiver unobservability
by using broadcast, which also has a worst case overhead
factor of Ω(N). Proposals roughly based on mixing include
Buses [1] and PipeNet [5]; these schemes can potentially re-
duce the communication overhead but have high latency and
are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks.
To avoid the high cost of unobservability, von Ahn, Bortz
and Hopper introduced the notion of k-anonymous commu-
nication [17], analogous to the notion of k-anonymity in data
privacy [16]. They observed that in many cases it could be
considered sufficient if each principal is only indistinguish-
able from a set of k − 1 other users, rather than all users
of the network. They gave a scheme with sender and recip-
ient k-anonymity that requires no trusted parties and has
worst-case overhead O(k2).
3. PERIODIC K-ANONYMITY
In this section we review the theoretical definition of k-
anonymity, and discuss why in practical terms no scheme
can provide k-anonymity. We then relax this definition
(which we call static k-anonymity) to a notion of periodic
k-anonymity which simulates the “churn” of a realistic net-
work. Finally, we discuss some ways in which a mix-like
scheme could be extended to achieve periodic k-anonymity.
3.1 Definitions
von Ahn et al. [17] define an anonymous communication
protocol for message space M as a computation among n
parties P1, . . . , PN , where each Pi starts with a series of pri-
vate inputs (msgi, pi) ∈ (M× [N ])∪ {(nil, nil)}, and each
party terminates with a private output from M∗. To com-
municate, time is split into rounds and after a setup round,
the same transmission protocol is run at each round. Intu-
itively, at the end of a round each Pi should learn the set of
messages addressed to him in that round ({msgj : pj = i}),
but not the identity of the senders. For any protocol P, we
define P(P1(x1), P2(x2), . . . , PN (xN )) to be a random vari-
able whose values are the transcripts of all communications
generated when P is run and each Pi has private input xi.
We now recall the definitions of sender and receiver k-
anonymity [17]; Static receiver and sender unobservability
can be defined as static N -anonymity.
Definition 1. A protocol P is sender k-anonymous if it
induces a partition {V1, . . . , Vl} of [N ] such that:
1. |Vs| ≥ k for all 1 ≤ s ≤ l; and
2. For every 1 ≤ s ≤ l, for all Pi, Pj ∈ Vs, for every
(msg, p) ∈ (M× [N ])∪{(nil, nil)}, the random vari-
ables P(Pi(msg, p), ∗) and P(Pj(msg, p), ∗) are com-
putationally indistinguishable.
That is, each party, acting as a sender, is indistinguishable
from at least k − 1 other parties.
Definition 2. A protocol P is receiver k-anonymous if
it induces a partition {V1, . . . , Vl} of [N ] such that:
1. |Vs| ≥ k for all 1 ≤ s ≤ l; and
2. For every 1 ≤ s ≤ l, for all Pi, Pj ∈ Vs, for ev-
ery P ′ ∈ [N ], and msg ∈ M, the random variables
P(P ′(msg, Pi), ∗) and P(P ′(msg, Pj), ∗) are computa-
tionally indistinguishable.
That is, each message sent to an honest party has at least k
indistinguishable recipients.
Notice that a static k-anonymous protocol will protect a
sender or receiver absolutely as long as the set of recipients
remains the same - he will always be indistinguishable from
at least k − 1 other participants. However, real-life network
protocols experience churn: new members will join the net-
work, old members will leave, and existing members may not
always be able to participate. To deal with this situation,
we introduce the notion of periodic k-anonymity. A periodic
anonymity protocol has a pool of participants {Q1, . . . , Qn}
out of which N parties – P1, . . . , PN – participate in each
round. A periodic protocol should have the property that if
the set S of participants in two rounds is the same, then the
partition V(S) = {V1, . . . , Vl} remains the same; if the set of
participants is different, then we assume that the partitions
V1,V2 are independent.1
In such a setting, which is essentially pessimistic for our
results, a critical security parameter (controlled by the envi-
ronment the protocol is used in, but not necessarily by the
deployer) is the churn rate. We say that an environment
has churn rate ρ if the set of participants only changes once
every ρ rounds. Low values of ρ mean that users will change
groups often and thus not “blend in” as well, while higher
values of ρ require a more stable network.
3.2 k-anonymity with a Mix
Although the protocol of [17] has “low overhead” in the-
oretical terms, it is not very practical for real deployment.
Much of this is due to the fact that the protocol is intended
to avoid the use of trusted servers. Here we give short
sketches of how a mix server could be modified to provide
periodic k-anonymity for senders or receivers while requiring
fairly minimal effort on the part of the receivers. Note that
it is not our intent to describe a complete system, as here
we are more interested in studying the effect of combining
k-anonymity with unlinkable systems than the exact details
of any particular protocol; From the point of view of the
disclosure and surveillance attacks, the anonymity scheme
is essentially a black box.
Receiver k-anonymity. Suppose a mix has a list of pos-
sible message recipients. This list could be obtained in a
number of ways - for example, requiring a sender to (anony-
mously) register any message recipient at least one round
before he will send a message; or just by adding an address
to the list when the mix sees a message with that destina-
tion address. It is easy for the mix to partition this list of
recipients into groups so that each recipient has at least k−1
others in his group. If each recipient has a public key, then
when processing a batch, the mix can encrypt dummy mes-
sages to send to each member of a group who does not have
a message in the batch, so that all k members of each group
receive the same number of messages out of each batch.
Sender k-anonymity. k-anonymity for senders could be
1We note that it would be desirable to engineer protocols so
that small changes in the set of participants leave many sets
of a partition unchanged, since this would further limit the
effectiveness of intersection attacks. If real-world protocols
are engineered in this way, our results will thus understate
the effectiveness of k-anonymity against intersection attacks.
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achieved in several ways. For example, the mix could re-
quire senders to enroll (with a public key), partition senders
into groups of at least k members, and then periodically
send “tokens” to all members of a group, requiring them
all to reply with either an encrypted dummy message or an
outgoing message before processing. Other alternatives are
possible if special software is employed, for example com-
posing the mix with the k-AMT protocol of von Ahn et al.
or the unobservable protocol of Golle and Juels [10].
4. STATISTICAL DISCLOSURE AGAINST
K-ANONYMITY
Mathewson and Dingledine [12] show that the statisti-
cal disclosure attack is in fact a very general attack which
can defeat many different types of mix networks as well as
many network countermeasures which protect against short-
term pattern analysis. In this attack, an adversary, without
prior knowledge of network conditions, attempts to proba-
bilistically identify Alice’s recipients based only on Alice’s
send pattern and the receive pattern of other nodes in the
network (whose received messages are composed of Alice’s
messages and background traffic from nodes other than Al-
ice). This attack is effective against many different types of
mix networks, but especially against those where variability
in the timing of message delivery is fairly low. In fact, the
attack is so strong that it’s possible to treat the entire mix
network as a black box while only concerning ourselves with
the pattern of how messages enter and leave the network.
The attack fails in only a few cases, such as when Alice’s
behavior is unpredictable, when the attacker can not observe
that Alice is sending messages, or when the attacker can not
observe how the network behaves at a time when Alice is not
sending messages.
4.1 Basic attack
The basic statistical disclosure attack [6] models Alice as
having m possible recipients. Every time Alice sends a mes-
sage, she picks a recipient from that set with probability
1
m
, and sends a message to the batch mix, addressed to the
selected recipient. The mix then receives b − 1 other mes-
sages addressed to recipients chosen uniformly from the N
participants in the network. The attack model’s Alice’s re-
cipients as a probability distribution −→v , with the value 1
m
in
the locations corresponding to Alice’s recipients, and 0 else-
where. We let the vector −→u model the background traffic of
the network in a similar manner, i.e. in the basic model we




The adversary constructs a vector −→o which models the
behavior of the network during any given round, such that
every recipient that received a message during a round Alice








−→v + (b − 1)−→u
b
.
We can then estimate −→v from the arithmetic mean of many






− (b − i)−→u .
Danezis [6] uses basic signal processing techniques to show
that in order to determine Alice’s recipients with 95% con-
fidence, it is sufficient to observe t rounds in which Alice
















Mathewson and Dingledine strengthen the Danezis inter-
section attack to more closely match real-world mix net-
works. Under the updated scheme, Alice is allowed to send
more than one message in any given round, and she can
select recipients (from a set of possible recipients) in a non-
uniform way. Also, the adversary is no longer required to
have complete knowledge of the background traffic distribu-
tion.
To carry out this attack, the adversary must first gather
a good sample of the network background during rounds
when Alice is not sending messages (the background distri-
bution estimate is similar to that in the original attack).
The attacker then observes rounds in which Alice partici-
pates (sends messages), and computes the arithmetic mean
of the probability vectors for each round as before. From





b · O − (b − m)U˜
where U is the estimate of the unknown background traffic.
Mathewson and Dingledine show the effectiveness of this
attack against the standard mix network, even with the un-
known background adversary and the weighted Alice. The
results for pool mix networks showed that the intersection
attack is very effective in low delay probability networks for
any message volume from Alice (being more effective at in-
termediate message volumes, and less effective at very low or
very high message volumes), but fails at higher delay prob-
abilities and low/high message volume from Alice, although
message volumes of 0.5-0.6 still yield a successful attack in
all cases.
Mathewson and Dingledine further extend the attack to
deal with pool mixes, sender dummy traffic, time-variant
background traffic, and partial observability. We do not
consider these measures here as we are focused mainly on
the effectiveness of k-anonymity.
4.3 Theoretical results
In this section, we develop two theoretical results about
the effects of periodic k-anonymity on the statistical disclo-
sure attack. First, we prove that even 1-periodic receiver
N -anonymity prevents statistical disclosure, up to revealing
information available to the attacker. Thus if we are willing
to tolerate high communication overhead, statistical disclo-
sure attacks can be essentially perfectly resisted. Second,
we derive a bound on the expected number of rounds nec-
essary to execute the statistical disclosure attack against a
ρ-periodic k-anonymous mix with uniform background traf-
fic, and show that this figure is super-linear in k, and at least
affine in ρ. Thus, higher values of k and a higher “churn pe-
riod” give better resistance to statistical disclosure.
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Suppose we have a periodic unobservable anonymity pro-
tocol in which all participants take part whenever they are
online. We would like to prove that no intersection attack
is possible on such a scheme - intuitively, the adversary can
never tell which participants are sending or receiving mes-
sages. Of course, no matter what protocol the participants
run, the adversary will still be able to see when the par-
ticipants are online and when they are offline. It is cer-
tainly possible to construct sequences of participant joins
and leaves so that this information leaks the communica-
tion patterns of the participants, but no anonymity scheme
could prevent such leakage, since any reasonable model of a
global adversary would allow him to see which participants
are online and offline (for example, by noting the presence or
absence of other traffic to the participants, or by “pinging”
them). In practical situations, however, we would expect
that most users do not show any noticeable correlation in
online status with their correspondents that they do not
also show with, e.g., other users on the same approximate
sleep schedule (in fact, they may show stronger correlation
to these users than their correspondents). The following the-
orem uses proof techniques developed in the cryptographic
literature to show that given the list of participants in each
period, an adversary learns no further information about the
communication patterns of the participants from a periodic
sender and receiver unobservable anonymity scheme.
Let
−→Q = 〈Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qt〉 be a sequence of participant
sets for a periodic unobservable networking protocol P; let−→
R = 〈R1, R2, . . . , Rt〉 be a sequence of recipients such that
Ri ∈ Qi ∪ nil, and let Palice(−→R,−→Q) denote the result of
running P with Alice sending encrypted messages to Ri at
round i, with participants Qi. The goal of a long-term inter-
section attack is to discover some information about
S
i{Ri}
given Palice(−→R,−→Q). We show that if Alice follows the pro-
tocol, then even when an attacker knows the recipient dis-
tribution of all other senders, whatever he can learn given
Palice(−→R,−→Q), he can also learn given only −→Q . Since an
adversary can always learn what principals are online at a
given time (for example, by use of “ping”) this implies that
periodic unobservability gives essentially the best possible
resistance to long-term intersection attacks.
Theorem 1. Under the conditions above, for every effi-
cient “disclosure” attacker A, there is a simulated attacker S
such that S(
−→Q) and A(Palice(−→R,−→Q)), are computationally
indistinguishable.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Imagine an alter-
native universe in which, for every round that Alice is online,
she sends a message to the first participant in Qi; let this
recipient list be denoted
−→
R′. Certainly, seeing the result of





R′ is uncorrelated to
−→
R , given−→Q . We will prove, however, that if the anonymity scheme is
periodically sender unobservable, then the transcripts with
these two sets are computationally indistinguishable: any-
thing you can efficiently learn from the first transcript (given−→Q) you can efficiently learn from the second as well.




R′ one element at a
time: first change R1 to R
′
1, then change R2 to R
′





R2, . . . ,
−→
Rt. Now the only difference
between Palice(−→R,−→Q) and Palice(−→R1,−→Q) is who Alice sends
to in the first round; but by receiver unobservability, we
know that the transcript of this first round should be indis-
tinguishable whether Alice sends to R1 or R
′
1. Similarly, the
only difference between Palice(−→Ri,−→Q) and Palice(−−→Ri+1,−→Q) is
the recipient in round i+1, and since the transcript in round
i+1 with Ri or R
′
i as recipients should be indistinguishable
by receiver unobservability, the entire transcripts should also
be indistinguishable. Extending this argument t times, we




distinguishable; this can be formalized as the standard “hy-




R′ = 〈R′1, R′2, . . . R′t〉 be any vector of
recipients such that Ri ∈ Qi \ {alice} when alice ∈ Qi and
Ri = nil otherwise. Then by the definition of unobserv-




−→Q) are indistinguishable. But since −→R′ can be
computed without knowing Alice’s private input
−→
R , Alice
follows the protocol, and the simulator knows the “back-
ground” distribution of other senders, S can simply simu-
late a complete run of the protocol using the participant sets−→Q , computing messages that Alice would output with −→R′ as
recipients and dummy messages as content. S can then run
A on this simulated transcript and output the result, and
since this input will be computationally indistinguishable
from Palice(−→R,−→Q), the output of S will be computationally
indistinguishable from A(Palice(−→R,−→Q)).
4.3.2 Bounds on statistical disclosure with periodic
k-anonymity
As in the original statistical disclosure attack, we can de-
rive, for a uniform background, the expected number of
rounds to distinguish the support of Alice’s recipient dis-
tribution from a noise coordinate, when using ρ-periodic k-
anonymity. We assume that in each round, Alice sends a
message to one of her m recipients chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, and (b − 1) other messages are delivered to recipients
chosen uniformly among the N participants. Furthermore,
each message delivered to a participant also causes k − 1
dummy deliveries to the participants in the same partition,
so that the expected number of messages delivered to each
non-recipient as a result of these inputs is (b − 1) k
N
.
We let l be a confidence parameter, and wish to solve for
the number of rounds t such that
μalice − μnoise > l(σalice + σnoise) .



















f(1 − fρ) + (b − 1)ε(1 − ε)









where f = N+(m−1)(k−1)
mN
. It can be verified that this bound
is better than linear in k
N
, for small values of k
N
, and essen-
tially linear in the batch size b and the churn rate ρ.
4.4 Simulation results
We modify the mixnet simulator from [12] to optionally
apply the k-anonymity transform to any currently-running
4.3.1 Periodic Unobservability prevents long-term
intersection
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Figure 1: Known background network with k-
anonymous group size of 16.
experiment. We simulate network churn by using static
k-anonymity for a number of rounds (ρ), then “churning”
the entire mix by breaking up all k-anonymous groups and
dynamically reforming them later, as needed. Groups are
formed when a recipient not yet assigned to a group gets a
message. That recipient is then assigned to a group with
up to k nodes, uniformly selected from all nodes that are
not members of a group. This is a gross simplification of
the way churn would work in a real network, in which in-
dividual nodes in a given k-anonymous group have a given
probability of leaving that group in any given round, either
voluntarily or due to failure.
The k-anonymity module works by modifying the traf-
fic vector
−→
t using an offset vector −→o . The traffic vector
represents the entire network message history (who received
messages, and how many), and the offset vector represents
the network activity during any given round. For every mes-
sage M ∈ −→o we copy the message into −→t , destined to the
original recipient R, and also add up to k copies destined to
every node in R’s k-anonymous group, thus increasing the




In order to confirm that our modified simulator preserves
the behavior of the original, we run the known background
simulation and apply the k-anonymity transform (k = 16)
with variable number of recipients. Figure 1 shows that
the behavior of the modified simulator is consistent with
the behavior of the original simulator (compare to Figure 1
in [12]).
Figure 2 shows that we achieve an anonymity improve-
ment that is larger than can be accounted for simply by the
increased number of messages in the network (the number
of rounds required for a successful intersection attack grows
faster than k, with best anonymity improvements visible at
higher k values): introducing k-anonymity into a standard
mixnet will increase the difficulty of the statistical disclosure
attack (on average) by a factor of k1.15 at a churn rate of
once every 60 rounds.
We additionally examine the behavior of k-anonymity to-
gether with complex sender behavior and unknown back-
ground traffic. For these experiments, we model the back-
ground traffic and sender traffic, or just the background traf-
fic, according to a small-world network model [20], which is
meant to represent real-world networks such as social net-
2The increase in the number of messages is slightly smaller,
in situations where k does not divide N without remainder,
in which case at least one group of size < k will be formed.
works and the Internet, where the majority of individuals
can communicate with each other just by maintaining con-
nections to a small number of other individuals. When the
sender or background traffic are not assumed to be “com-
plex,” Alice or the background select recipients uniformly
from the appropriate set. Figure 3 shows that the privacy-
enhancing effect of k-anonymity is retained even in complex
mixnet models. Once again, the privacy benefit is slightly
super-linear in k with a traffic volume increase of at most a
factor of k+1
2
. Note that in (a), the line for m = 16 flattens
at k ≥ 8 because attacks fail to succeed before the cutoff of
5000000 rounds.
5. RESISTING MASS SURVEILLANCE
Consider the problem of concealing the fact that Alice and
Bob communicate with each other. Cryptography can hide
the contents of their communications, and anonymity can
(perhaps) hide the fact that they communicate (for some
time), when only their communications are under observa-
tion. However, in most cases Alice and Bob will not only
communicate with each other, but will be part of a larger
“social network” [19]. Thus we would expect that Alice and
Bob’s correspondence may well be leaked in their dealings
with others, so that even if Alice and Bob are not compro-
mised, compromising other nodes in the network may reveal
their existence and correspondence as well.
5.1 Setting
Danezis and Wittneben [7] introduce the following nat-
ural problem in this setting: given that such externalities
exist, and that there is a definite cost in compromising each
member of a social network – for example, the risk of being
caught, or the cost of obtaining a warrant, plus perhaps the
cost of finding and exploiting a security weakness in a given
machine – how can an adversary maximize the number of
correspondences learned, or the number of individuals under
“indirect” surveillance for a given surveillance budget? Or,
from the point of view of security, how can we maximize the
resistance of a social network to such surveillance efforts?
We follow [7] in modeling a social network as a set of
individuals, who are connected to spaces. The reader may
think of a space as a club or committee; communication be-
tween its members is assumed to form a clique. The link
between an individual and a space has an associated weight,
which indicates the volume of traffic the individual sends
to the space. The problem then becomes, given partial in-
formation about the members of the network, to maximize
the number of individuals or spaces under surveillance for a
given number of compromised individuals.
Danezis and Wittneben study the efficacy of many surveil-
lance strategies given full information about a social network
and given only the total volume of communications by each
node in the network – exactly the information leaked by an
unlinkable anonymity scheme such as a mix network. They
use as a basis for their study a social network constructed
from the mailing list archive of an international political or-
ganization; their data set spans roughly three years, and
consists of 2338 people in 373 spaces.
The authors of [7] find that, given full information on the
communication patterns of a network, a very small number
of compromises can lead to surveillance of essentially the
entire network. An adversary who first compromises the
invididual connected to the most spaces, and subsequently
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Figure 2: Statistical disclosure results against a known background distribution for varying levels of k with
(a) N = 32 and (b) N = 64.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Experiments using attack adapted to unknown background distribution. (a) Small-world geometric
network network model used for both background and sender distributions; (b) Small-world geometric model
background, uniform sender distribution; (c) Uniform background and sender distributions.
compromises individual that maximize the new number of
spaces under surveillance, can uncover 100% of the spaces
while compromising only 8% of the individuals in the net-
work, and can uncover 50% of spaces by compromising less
than 2% of the individuals.
To assess the effectiveness of unlinkable anonymity against
mass surveillance, the authors simulated an adversary who
first compromises the individual with the highest total vol-
ume of traffic, and subsequent compromises the nodes with
the highest remaining volume of traffic. This strategy, shown
to be more effective than an adaptive strategy, uncovers
50% of spaces with only 5% of nodes compromised. Thus,
while unlinkability moderately improves resistance to mass
surveillance, it does not do so dramatically. [7] conjecture
that unobservability is needed to provide better resistance
against mass surveillance attacks.
5.2 Our results
To test the resistance of unobservability, k-anonymity, and
periodic k-anonymity against mass surveillance, we obtained
three public data sets of a nature similar to those used by [7]:
• ietf: the public archive of the mailing lists of the In-
ternet Engineering Task Force, since January 1, 2000.
This network consisted of 10978 individuals participat-
ing in 305 spaces.
• w3c: the complete public archive of the mailing lists of
the World Wide Web Consortium. This data set had
16644 individuals participating in 269 spaces, with the
earliest posts occurring in June 1994, up until June
2006.
• hwg: the complete public archive of the mailing lists
of the HTML Writers’ Guild. This data set had 4418
individuals participating in 19 spaces, with the earliest
postings in December 1997 and the latest posting in
February 2005.
Figure 4 shows the degree distributions of the individuals
of each data set. As expected, all three data sets match a
power law distribution, as in the data sets of [7].
We performed three sets of experiments. The first ex-
periment measured the surveillance resistance of each data
set with no anonymity scheme, with an unlinkable scheme,
and with unobservability. The second experiment measured
the effect of static k-anonymity on surveillance resistance
for various levels of k. Finally, we measured the effect of
periodic churn with various levels of k-anonymity.
5.2.1 Full information, unlinkability, and unobserv-
ability
For each data set, we simulated the attack based on full in-
formation and the attack based on volume information only,
as described in [7]. Our results confirm the experiments re-
ported there; in fact, surveillance is even more effective on
our data sets. For instance, in the ietf data set, with full
information, all spaces are uncovered with only 41 individ-
uals, or 0.4%, under direct surveillance and 50% of spaces
are uncovered with only 3 individuals under direct surveil-
lance. In the same data set, with only volume information,
90% of spaces are uncovered with only 147 individuals under
direct surveillance, or about 1.4%, while 50% of spaces are
uncovered with only 9 individuals under direct surveillance.
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Figure 4: Degree distribution plots for the three data sets used in our experiments. All data sets follow a
power-law distribution, as expected in social networks.
(ietf) (w3c) (hwg)
Figure 5: Results of surveillance (people and spaces uncovered) for optimal surveillance, unlinkable surveil-
lance, and unobservable surveillance, for each data set.
An anonymity scheme with static unobservability would
give an adversary no information, aside from a list of proba-
ble members, about the connections between them; thus the
only surveillance strategy available would be to randomly
select individuals for direct surveillance. We simulated 10
random trials of this attack against each data set. Our re-
sults suggest that unobservability may still be insufficient
as a defense against mass surveillance. For example, in the
ietf data set, on average 50% of spaces are uncovered with
127 individuals, or 1.2%, under direct surveillance and 90%
of spaces are uncovered with 1434 individuals, or less than
15%, under direct surveillance. While this is a significant im-
provement in resistance over unlinkability (for our dataset),
it is still far from the ideal situation in which we would
hope to require 50% of individuals under direct surveillance
to uncover 50% of spaces. Our results for all data sets are
summarized in Figure 5.
5.2.2 Effects of k-anonymity and churn
To assess whether static, unlinkable k-anonymity could
offer resistance similar to unobservability, we simulated 10
runs (with randomly chosen partitions of senders) of the
unlinkability attacker against a k-anonymized data set for
k ∈ {2, 8, 32}. In these trials, every time some Alice in our
data set sent a message to a mailing list, we incremented the
“apparent volume” of each member of her k-individual par-
tition; the attacker then selected individuals to place under
surveillance by decreasing “apparent volume.”
Our results show that k-anonymity can offer some benefit
over unlinkability at a much lower communication overhead
than static unobservability. For example, with k = 2, in
the ietf data set, 50% of spaces are uncovered with 14 in-
dividuals under direct surveillance (opposed to 9), and for
k = 32 the number of individuals required to uncover 50% of
spaces on average was 77. For k = 32, the average number
of individuals required to be under direct surveillance to un-
cover 90% of spaces was 845. Full results of this experiment
appear in Figure 6.
To simulate the effects of churn on the resistance provided
by k-anonymity, we divided time into periods of one day,
one week, one month, and one year. An individual was
considered to be a participant for a given time period if
he/she contributed at least one posting during that time
period. For each time period, the set of participants were
grouped into randomized partitions of size at least k, and
each time an individual in a partition sent a posting, all k
members of the partition had their “apparent traffic volume”
incremented. We then simulated the attacker who selects
individuals in decreasing order of apparent volume.
Our results show that even a modest rate of churn (once a
year) will significantly aid the attacker. For example, with
the ietf data set, when k = 32, the average number of
individuals under surveillance required to uncover 50% of
spaces with churn of one week, one month, and one year
were 5, 6, and 46, respectively. To uncover 90% of spaces,
the required number of individuals were 173, 189, and 379,
respectively. Results for the experiment with k = 8 on all
three data sets are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 6: Results of surveillance, (fraction of spaces uncovered) with static k anonymity, for k ∈ {2, 8, 32}
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Figure 7: Results of surveillance, (fraction of spaces uncovered) with periodic 8-anonymity, for churn of one
day, one week, and one year.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Regarding resistance to statistical disclosure, our results
suggest that receiver k-anonymity can strengthen a batch
mix against long-term intersection attacks, for low values of
k. This strengthening is improved when the list of willing
recipients of a mix has a higher churn interval. It is not a
“time-space tradeoff” in the sense that increasing traffic by
a factor of k/2 improves resistance to the disclosure attack
by a minimum factor of k1.15.
Regarding mass surveillance, we conclude that unobserv-
ability and periodic sender k-anonymity in environments
with low churn can significantly improve resistance to mass
surveillance (the value of such systems is less “questionable”
than in the case of unlinkable anonymity schemes), but still
does not approach the optimal cost function.
In terms of resistance to intersection-type attacks, our
work raises several interesting questions for future research.
For example, how would receiver k-anonymity interact with
the resistance provided by various techniques explored in [12]
such as pool mixes and sender padding? What is the effect
of sender k-anonymity on statistical disclosure attacks? It
would also be of interest to find good estimators of the dif-
ficulty of statistical disclosure with k-anonymity when the
background traffic is unknown.
In terms of resisting mass surveillance, an interesting ques-
tion is how the parameters of the social network influence
the value of various anonymity mechanisms. We also ex-
pect that it will be challenging to find new techniques that
protect social networks from this type of leakage.
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